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This paper asks what can be learned from observed merger pairings when acquirers and targets meet in a two-sided market with transferable utility. A compact assignment-game model implies revealed-preference inequalities: observed matches must generate at least as much total surplus as feasible counterfactual matches in the same local market. I take these inequalities to Refinitiv M&A data for U.S. same-industry transactions during 2010–2024. The final estimation sample contains 1025 completed acquirer-target pairs and 36,881 financially feasible counterfactual pairs constructed within industry-quarter cells. A benchmark linear surplus specification based on differences in profitability, leverage, sales growth, and liquidity has weak identifying content. Across 60 optimization runs, the same maximum score is obtained, but the coefficient vectors attaining it differ substantially in sign and magnitude. The result is not a general impossibility claim about revealed-preference methods. It shows that observed matches and standard financial differences alone provide limited discipline on merger surplus when transfers, outside options, and richer pair-specific synergies are unobserved.
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Suwan Long (2026) studied this question.
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