What question did this study set out to answer?

To examine whether transitioning to a parliamentary government resolves Kenya's recurrent electoral conflict and to identify the primary structural drivers of winner-take-all political competition.

August 14, 2026Open Access

Beyond Constitutional Engineering: Why Parliamentary Government Alone Cannot Resolve Electoral Conflict in Kenya

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Authors

MAMohamed Hussein Abdiweli SASteven Ouma Akoth SNSamuel Alfayo Nyanchoga

Discussion

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Overview

Comparative analysis reveals that executive redesign alone fails to resolve electoral conflict in Kenya, indicating institutional credibility and devolution are more vital for stability.

Key Points

To examine whether transitioning to a parliamentary government resolves Kenya's recurrent electoral conflict and to identify the primary structural drivers of winner-take-all political competition.
Conducted process tracing of Kenya's constitutional and electoral trajectory from 1963 to 2026.
Performed a comparative analysis across eight jurisdictions, evaluating constitutional texts, Supreme Court judgments, electoral declarations, executive forms, and conflict intensity.
Found that electoral conflict stems from an indivisible presidency, concentrated appointive and distributive power, lack of credible roles for defeated candidates, and material exclusion stakes rather than executive form.
Demonstrated that presidential systems achieve peaceful alternation when courts and electoral commissions are credible, while devolution and informal elite settlements mitigate conflict more effectively than parliamentary redesign.

Cite This Study

Abdiweli et al. (2026) studied this question.

synapsesocial.com/papers/6a7ec79cb70b84ec8b91410c https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21897750

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August 14, 2026Open Access

Beyond Constitutional Engineering: Why Parliamentary Government Alone Cannot Resolve Electoral Conflict in Kenya

View Full Paper

Ask AI

Bookmark

Authors

MAMohamed Hussein Abdiweli SASteven Ouma Akoth SNSamuel Alfayo Nyanchoga

Discussion

Member takes

Overview

Comparative analysis reveals that executive redesign alone fails to resolve electoral conflict in Kenya, indicating institutional credibility and devolution are more vital for stability.

Key Points

To examine whether transitioning to a parliamentary government resolves Kenya's recurrent electoral conflict and to identify the primary structural drivers of winner-take-all political competition.
Conducted process tracing of Kenya's constitutional and electoral trajectory from 1963 to 2026.
Performed a comparative analysis across eight jurisdictions, evaluating constitutional texts, Supreme Court judgments, electoral declarations, executive forms, and conflict intensity.
Found that electoral conflict stems from an indivisible presidency, concentrated appointive and distributive power, lack of credible roles for defeated candidates, and material exclusion stakes rather than executive form.
Demonstrated that presidential systems achieve peaceful alternation when courts and electoral commissions are credible, while devolution and informal elite settlements mitigate conflict more effectively than parliamentary redesign.

Cite This Study

Abdiweli et al. (2026) studied this question.

synapsesocial.com/papers/6a7ec79cb70b84ec8b91410c https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21897750

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