The Case Against Corporate Switching Defenses

An environmental organization recently sued Shell, demanding that it reduce CO₂ emissions to prevent climate harm. Shell defended itself by claiming that reducing its emissions would make no difference, since competitors would step in to satisfy consumer demand. This paper challenges such “corporate switching defenses.” Drawing on a distinction between switching cases—where an agent merely redirects harm—and preemption cases—where an agent causes harm despite the presence of backups—we argue that cases like Shell’s are not genuine switching cases but are better understood as preemption cases. Even if competitors would step in, Shell’s continued operations make climate harms more secure: they move the world further from a situation where climate harm is averted or lessened. We introduce the notion of security to explain this difference and show why it matters for assigning responsibility. This account strengthens the rationale for imposing a reduction obligation on Shell even when global emissions remain unchanged. More broadly, switching defenses arise in other contexts—for example, garment firms claiming that better labor standards will only lead others to undercut them. The same reasoning applies in such cases, offering a principled basis for rejecting switching defenses.