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Although the relationship between fear and affiliation, first documented by Schachter (1959), has traditionally been interpreted in terms of social comparison motives and, less frequently, fear-reduction motives, an explanation based on a combination of fear-reduction and what Schachter called “cognitive clarity” is equally capable of explaining the data. The latter interpretation has the advantage of being compatible with current stress and coping models (e.g., Lazarus & Folkman, 1984), according to which affiliation and nonaffiliation can be conceptualized in terms of problem-focused and emotion-focused strategies for coping with a stressful event. We outline such an approach for studying the relationship between fear and affiliation, and report an experiment that directly compared the cognitive clarity and social comparison hypotheses. College students imagined themselves in a typical fear-affiliation experiment in which they were anticipating a threatening or innocuous experience, and chose whether or not—and with whom—to affiliate. Subjects' waiting choices supported the cognitive clarity explanation of the fear-affiliation effect, and examination of their self-reported reasons for their choices indicated that fear-reduction motives were also prevalent. Validation of the role-taking methodology was obtained in a second experiment, in which the same simulation procedure was used to replicate the pattern of findings from a widely cited fear-affiliation study (Zimbardo & Formica, 1963). Subjects' reasons for their choices in the second experiment called into question the traditional social-comparison explanation of Zimbardo and Formica's results.
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Kirkpatrick et al. (1988) studied this question.
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