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Randomized controlled trial demonstrates price anchoring biases farmers' willingness to pay for insurance, suggesting default nudges and loss framing significantly boost adoption.
Current research on farmers’ insurance decision-making lacks rigorous behavioral experiments capable of revealing the micro-level psychological pathway through which long-term subsidy policies induce anchoring effects and hinder insurance conversion. This paper adopts a hybrid contextualized randomized controlled trial to study anchoring effects and intervention mechanisms in farmers’ insurance decisions. Real field decision-making elements are embedded into a controlled laboratory environment to construct a contextualized task with high ecological validity. Initial premium anchors and multidimensional intervention strategies are randomly manipulated as experimental stimuli, enabling precise measurement of anchoring strength and behavioral correction effects. The results show that long-term subsidies, as a price anchor, produce an 18.2 yuan/mu group bias in farmers’ willingness to pay. Under a low-anchor background, a combined intervention integrating loss-frame information and a default insurance structure increases the insurance conversion rate to 84.2%, while the matching rate of insurance adequacy reaches 0.92. This study provides micro-causal evidence for irrational bias in farmers’ insurance decisions and supports low-cost, high-precision behavioral intervention policy design.
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Zhou et al. (2026) studied this question.
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