Time for electoral reform: the role of the economy

This study explores how economic conditions, executive power, and party dynamics interact to shape electoral reform. It argues that poor economic performance encourages political entrepreneurs—particularly opposition parties—to push for changes to the electoral system. However, the president’s electoral mandate and institutional powers also play a key role in determining whether reforms occur. In presidential systems, executives may influence reforms to benefit their own parties. The study further suggests that government type matters. Single-party majority governments are more likely to pursue reforms aligned with presidential and ruling party interests, while minority or coalition governments may constrain such influence. Empirical findings support these arguments. Poor economic conditions increase the likelihood of electoral reform, but this effect depends on executive authority and government structure. Notably, reforms are less likely in presidential systems than in semi-presidential systems during economic downturns. Additionally, changes in the real effective exchange rate have a stronger positive impact on reform probability in semi-presidential systems. Overall, the results highlight that electoral reform is not driven by economic factors alone but emerges from a complex interaction between economic pressures, executive power, and political party incentives.