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Governments and environmental NGOs campaign for carbon footprint reductions by households. Many of the behavioral changes recommended reduce demand for goods produced by sectors covered by cap-and-trade schemes. With a binding cap, greenhouse gas emissions from those sectors do not change. I show that climate campaigns create leakage effects if coverage of cap-and-trade schemes is incomplete. Campaigns that shift demand away from sectors subject to a cap increase aggregate emissions, as do campaigns to reduce carbon footprints generally if the capped sectors are emission intensive. However, campaigns targeting sectors not covered by a cap-and-trade scheme or propagating retiring of emission allowances reduce emissions.
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Grischa Perino (2015) studied this question.
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