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Canada must decide what type of multilateral actor it wants to be in its security relations in Southeast Asia, especially in light of the recent release of Ottawa’s official “Indo-Pacific Strategy” (IPS) in late 2022. There is growing disconnect between Canada’s national self-perception as an established middle-power and successful promoter of development and democracy in the region, and how Canada is increasingly regarded in Southeast Asia: as a mostly peripheral aide-de-camp of Anglo-American global hegemony. In this context, a strong case can be made for Canada’s need to chart a path in Southeast Asian security relations that is distinct from American interests, and that promotes meaningful engagement with ASEAN and its member states along a variety of registers, scales, and tracks. Importantly, Canada’s reputational decline in Southeast Asia is emblematic of a larger problem, which is its diminishing regional role and stature as a credible and honest broker of multilateralism in support of a rules based international order. It remains to be seen whether or not Canada’s IPS can adequately rise to these ongoing challenges.
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Jennifer Mustapha (2023) studied this question.
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