ASEAN’s perceptions and expectations from India as a rising Indo–Pacific power

India’s strategic ascent and deepening diplomatic clout in the Indo–Pacific over the past decade has garnered renewed interest from Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its member countries. Traditionally viewed as a South Asian power, India has successfully transformed its image as a responsible stakeholder in the Indo–Pacific—one that is not only any longer “boxed-in” in the South Asian region but is also finding new ways to build regional cooperation through minilateral and multilateral, regional and subregional mechanisms such as BBIN (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal), BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation), Mekong Ganga Cooperation (MGC), and CSC (Colombo Security Conclave). In the Indo–Pacific, India’s Act East Policy and its extensions such as IPOI (Indo–Pacific Oceans Initiative) and SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region), rechristened as MAHASAGAR (Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions) in March 2025, have served as anchors to establish it as a key regional stakeholder. This shift is amid escalating strategic competition, compelling ASEAN and its member states to navigate increasingly complex geostrategic terrain. Against this backdrop, ASEAN’s view of India is shaped by three primary factors: India’s role in the subcontinent, its strategic outreach to East and Southeast Asia and the Pacific Island countries, as well as its efforts to navigate the complex US–China dynamics and relations with both the superpowers. This article examines ASEAN’s perception of India’s role in South Asia and the wider Indo–Pacific region, especially in the context of China’s growing strategic belligerence, the US policy flipflops with friends and rivals alike in the region, and intensifying US–China strategic rivalry. It argues that ASEAN generally sees India as a stabilizing force and a strategic counterweight to China. This perception is filtered through the bloc’s interest in maintaining neutrality, economic resilience, and regional security. Drawing comparisons between South and Southeast Asia, the article analyses the trilateral India–China–US dynamics and its asymmetric impacts on both the regions. It concludes that while India’s normative and strategic alignment with ASEAN and its member states is a strong asset, its economic capacity shortfalls, and delivery deficits continue to constrain deeper wholesome engagement.