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We analyze the maximal extractable value in multiple concurrent proposer blockchains, where multiple blocks become data available before their final execution order is determined. This concurrency breaks the single builder assumption of sequential chains and introduces new maximal extractable value (MEV) channels, including same-tick duplicate steals, proposer-to-proposer auctions, and timing races driven by proof of availability latency. We develop a hazard-normalized model of delay and inclusion, derive a closed-form delay envelope M ( τ ) , and characterize equilibria for censorship, duplication, and auction games. We show how deterministic priority directed acyclic graph (DAG) scheduling and duplicate-aware payouts neutralize same-tick MEV while preserving throughput, identifying simple protocol configurations to mitigate multiple concurrent proposer (MCP)-specific extraction without centralized builders.
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Marsh et al. (2026) studied this question.
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