On Weights of Constant-Sum Majority Games

Previous article Next article On Weights of Constant-Sum Majority GamesBezalel PelegBezalel Peleghttps://doi.org/10.1137/0116042PDFBibTexSections ToolsAdd to favoritesExport CitationTrack CitationsEmail SectionsAbout[1] Morton Davis and , Michael Maschler, The kernel of a cooperative game, Naval Res. Logist. Quart., 12 (1965), 223–259 MR0207404 0204.20202 CrossrefGoogle Scholar[2] J. R. Isbell, A class of majority games, Quart. J. Math. Oxford Ser. (2), 7 (1956), 183–187 MR0097027 0073.13401 CrossrefGoogle Scholar[3] John R. Isbell, On the enumeration of majority games, Math. Tables Aids Comput., 13 (1959), 21–28 MR0103129 0139.13803 CrossrefGoogle Scholar[4] M. Maschler and , B. Peleg, A characterization, existence proof and dimension bounds for the kernel of a game, Pacific J. Math., 18 (1966), 289–328 MR0205699 0144.43403 CrossrefISIGoogle Scholar[5] D. Schmeidler, The nucleolus of a characteristic function game, Research Program in Game Theory and Mathematical Economics, RM 23, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, 1966 Google Scholar[6] L. S. Shapley, Simple games: an outline of the descriptive theory, Behavioral Sci., 7 (1962), 59–66 MR0136457 CrossrefGoogle Scholar[7] L. S. Shapley, On balanced sets and cores, RM-4601-PR, The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California, 1965 Google Scholar[8] J. von Neumann and , O. Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1953 0053.09303 Google Scholar Previous article Next article FiguresRelatedReferencesCited byDetails An Adaptive Model of Demand Adjustment in Weighted Majority Games26 December 2021 | Games, Vol. 13, No. 1 Cross Ref Winning coalitions in plurality voting democracies6 October 2020 | Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 56, No. 3 Cross Ref A generalization of Peleg’s representation theorem on constant-sum weighted majority games10 June 2019 | Economic Theory Bulletin, Vol. 8, No. 1 Cross Ref Proper strong-Fibonacci games6 September 2018 | Decisions in Economics and Finance, Vol. 41, No. 2 Cross Ref Approximating Power by WeightsSSRN Electronic Journal Cross Ref Game Theory15 February 2018 Cross Ref On the characterization of weighted simple games31 May 2017 | Theory and Decision, Vol. 83, No. 4 Cross Ref The Integer Nucleolus of Directed Simple Games: A Characterization and an Algorithm28 February 2017 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F. Lucas18 July 2006 | SIAM Review, Vol. 13, No. 4AbstractPDF (3775 KB)The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function GameDavid Schmeidler17 February 2012 | SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics, Vol. 17, No. 6AbstractPDF (773 KB) Volume 16, Issue 3| 1968SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics History Submitted:22 September 1967Published online:12 July 2006 InformationCopyright © 1968 Society for Industrial and Applied MathematicsPDF Download Article & Publication DataArticle DOI:10.1137/0116042Article page range:pp. 527-532ISSN (print):0036-1399ISSN (online):1095-712XPublisher:Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics