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This paper investigates the optimal management of an aggregated defined benefit (DB) pension plan under partial information. The pension plan manager invests in a financial market where the expected returns on risky assets are unknown. The manager has heterogeneous preferences concerning fund wealth and contribution risk. The preference for terminal wealth is modeled using the mean-variance criterion, while contribution risk is captured by a convex function. The manager's goal is to maximize the mean-variance criterion for terminal wealth while minimizing contribution risk. The optimization problem, which includes the variance operator and a non-exponential discount function, is time-inconsistent, and we address it within a game-theoretic framework by exploring the equilibrium strategy. We derive and solve the associated extended Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations. The equilibrium investment strategy is composed of two components: myopic demand and hedging demand. The equilibrium contribution rate is determined solely by the risk-free interest rate, the function of contribution risk and the manager's tolerance towards it. Finally, numerical results are provided to demonstrate the impacts of economic parameters on the equilibrium strategies.
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Guan et al. (2025) studied this question.
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