Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
Credit constraints linking debt to market-determined prices embody a systemic credit externality that drives a wedge between competitive and constrained socially optimal equilibria, inducing private agents to overborrow. This externality arises because private agents fail to internalize the financial amplification effects of carrying a large amount of debt when credit constraints bind. We conduct a quantitative analysis of this externality in a two-sector dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model of a small open economy calibrated to emerging markets. Raising the cost of borrowing during tranquil times restores constrained efficiency and significantly reduces the incidence and severity of financial crises.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Javier Bianchi (2011) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 10 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: