From Acceptance of Punishment to (Non-)evasion in Disobedience

This paper reconsiders the role of punishment in theories of civil disobedience through three contributions. First, it shows that accepting punishment, as commonly understood, is neither essential to defining civil disobedience nor key to its success. Philosophical discussions have overlooked the complex path of civil disobedience through the political-legal system, where most cases never reach trial and outcomes depend heavily on state discretion. Second, it introduces “non-evasion,” a sequential set of civility-based demands that arise as disobedient agents confront law enforcement and courts: publicly risking arrest, submitting to arrest, cooperating with jail proceedings, appearing in court when summoned, respecting courtroom decorum, and abiding by judicial decisions. This framework clarifies what civility plausibly requires at each stage of interaction with the state. Third, it identifies conditions under which civility’s moral weight is lifted and defends “evasion”—deliberate departures from non-evasion—as sometimes morally permissible, albeit uncivil. The paper explores both instrumental and intrinsic grounds for evasion, highlighting its epistemic communicative, affective-expressive, and transformative-prefigurative value.