Quantitative equilibrium analysis reveals rent guarantee insurance reduces homelessness among vulnerable renters, highlighting that targeted access maintains financial viability.
A rent guarantee insurance (RGI) policy makes a limited number of rent payments to the landlord on behalf of an insured tenant unable to pay rent due to a negative income or health expenditure shock. We introduce RGI in a rich quantitative equilibrium model of housing insecurity and show it increases welfare by improving risk sharing across idiosyncratic and aggregate states of the world, reducing the need for a large security deposits, and reducing homelessness which imposes large costs on society. While unrestricted access to RGI is not financially viable due to moral hazard and adverse selection, restricting access can restore viability. Private insurers target better off renters to break even, while public insurers focus on households most at-risk of homelessness. Stronger tenant protections increase the effectiveness of RGI.
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Abramson et al. (2026) studied this question.
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