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This article examines the phenomenon of information terrorism in Russian media discourse during 2022–2025, focusing on the systematic use of linguistic, visual, and narrative strategies that frame Ukraine as a source of “terrorist threat.” The research integrates theoretical approaches to terrorism discourse (Schmid, Jackson, Bourdieu, Entman) with a corpus-based analysis of Russian state-controlled media. Using event-based keyword sampling and coding in MAXQDA, four dominant strategic frames were identified: delegitimization of Ukrainian political leadership, demonization of the Armed Forces and volunteer battalions, victimization of the Russian population, and heroization of Russian actions. Each strategy was shown to rely on recurring lexical markers (“terrorist regime,” “ukronazis,” “victims of shelling”), visual codes (ruins, wounded civilians, military equipment), and narrative patterns (Ukraine as aggressor, Russia as defender). The study demonstrates how these frames function not in isolation but in interaction, reinforcing a binary worldview where Russia appears as the victim and savior, while Ukraine is constructed as a terrorist state. Quantitative coding revealed dynamic shifts: while early 2022 discourse relied on mobilizing demonization, later stages (2024–2025) emphasized hybrid frames combining victimization and heroization to justify prolonged aggression. The findings contribute to the broader field of media and terrorism studies by conceptualizing “information terrorism” as a communicative practice that stigmatizes opponents, legitimizes violence, and mobilizes domestic and international audiences.
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Gorodenko et al. (2025) studied this question.
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