Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
This editorial highlights the critical need for specialty-specific, detailed incident reporting by anesthetists themselves to effectively learn from and prevent adverse events.
Anaesthetists are proud of their reputation for safety and can point to initiatives in engineering, training and practice guidelines to support it [1]. Many of these advances have been guided by incident reporting. In 1954 Flanagan reported using interviews to collect data on observed behaviours (which he called ‘critical incidents’) to improve the selection and training of air force pilots and the design of aeroplane cockpits [2]. However Cooper is unquestionably the pioneer of incident reporting in anaesthesia. In 1978 he and his colleagues conducted 47 interviews of staff and resident anaesthesiologists and obtained descriptions of 359 preventable incidents in anaesthesia [3]. This process was described as a ‘modified critical incident analysis’. Cooper recognised that near misses, being more common than adverse events, are a particularly valuable source of information. He also recognised the limitation of retrospective data collection through interview and advocated more immediate reporting of incidents. Further studies based on critical incident reporting followed from Cooper’s group, with the emphasis always on learning from mistakes and preventing recurrences rather than allocating blame [4]. About 10 years later Runciman established the Australian Incident Monitoring Study (AIMS) under the banner of the Australian Patient Safety Foundation [5]. A symposium issue of Anaesthesia and Intensive Care was devoted to a series of papers containing many recommendations based on the first 2000 incidents reported to this study [6]. A crisis management manual based on these reports was released in 1996. This manual (http://www.apsf.com.au/crisis_management/Crisis_Management_Start.htm) and the original papers have now been updated taking into account the lessons of the next 2000 incidents [7]. An analysis of the most recent 1000 incidents is due to be published in the Australian and New Zealand College of Anaesthetists (ANZCA) Bulletin this year. Various researchers have accessed the database over the years and produced recommendations on specific aspects of anaesthesia care [8, 9]. The universal adoption in Australia and New Zealand (as in numerous other countries) of many valuable monitors has become one of the success stories of safety in anaesthesia and obviated the need for several of the original fields on the AIMS forms. The fact that a new interface is needed is a graphic illustration of the value of incident reporting. AIMS has been an inspiring and successful example of improving patient care through incident reporting by anaesthetists themselves. The attraction of extending this concept to a universal incident reporting system for all healthcare providers is self-evident. The Australian Patient Safety Foundation has long-since taken incident reporting beyond the boundaries of anaesthesia and developed an extensive classification framework to support a generic incident reporting system for any aspect of healthcare [10]. This system is now in use in several states of Australia, in South Africa, in parts of New Zealand and elsewhere. A single world-wide system would be ideal, but may be unattainable. In Britain the National Health Service (NHS) has provided the National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) a unique opportunity to develop the first comprehensive national reporting system for patient safety incidents in the world – the National Reporting and Learning System (NRLS). Any ‘unintended or unexpected incident that could have or did lead to harm for one or more patients receiving NHS funded care’ qualifies for this system. In the present issue of Anaesthesia, Catchpole, Bell and Johnson present an analysis of 12 606 incidents related to anaesthesia, for the period January 2004 to February 2006, drawn from an impressive 550 000 reports held in the NRLS database at the time of their study [11]. The NRLS cost over £5 million to establish. These anaesthesia-related reports represent less than 2.5% of the total collected thus far, so, on a pro-rata basis they cost just under £10 per report. It is hard to know how much incident reporting should cost, and comparative costs for other systems, such as AIMS, are not readily ascertainable. Nevertheless, this is a substantial investment so it is vital that the messages from these incidents are adequately promulgated to those responsible for the delivery of safe anaesthesia, and that any opportunities to improve anaesthetic practice identified by these data are addressed. It is disappointing, therefore, to find the authors admitting that ‘the lack of detail inherent in generic data fields prohibits translation of these results into robust arguments for immediate change in clinical practice’. For example, there were 20 serious events in the category ‘equipment/device’, but no indication of what equipment was involved, let alone what might be done to prevent similar mishaps in the future. The authors say that the free text information is most valuable, but give no examples. Perhaps more data on the equipment is available in the free text, but if so it is not reported. Lack of relevant detail is a problem that cannot be overcome simply by increasing the number of reports. Ideally, further information would be sought from those writing the reports, but the NRLS reports are de-identified, and there are strong arguments in favour of this approach, given the strong emphasis on blame that seems to pervade society today [12]. The alarming recent increase in prosecutions of doctors for manslaughter in England [13] is certainly relevant to this point. It does seem as if a modest number of focussed reports may be more informative than many generic ones. Of course, many focussed reports would be even better: large data sets are required to capture infrequent events. While disasters (such as the well known tragedies with vincristine) would come to light anyway, simply on the strength of their appalling consequences, much of the value of incident reporting lies in capturing less obvious events, and near misses, in the hope of learning from experience before too many (ideally any) patients are harmed. This point is well made by Catchpole et al. These authors acknowledge that it would be better for reports to be submitted by the professionals (anaesthetists in this case) most closely involved with the incidents. They are unable to identify the sources of their reports and speculate (plausibly) that the majority have come from nursing staff who, presumably, often report as observers of rather than participants in the incidents. Anecdotal evidence from Australia and New Zealand suggests that in hospitals with similarly generic incident reporting systems few, if any, anaesthetists enter reports. Genuine engagement by the speciality in question is critically important to the success of incident reporting and, as outlined above, the value of such engagement was demonstrated in the early AIMS days. Unfortunately, the converse can be seen from more recent times. The move by the APSF to a generic approach somewhat akin to that of the NRLS may have added to patient safety overall, but it has been associated with a loss of perceived ownership of the process by anaesthetists in Australia and New Zealand, and a sense that anaesthesia incident reporting has lost momentum. The Australian and New Zealand Tripartite Data Committee has recently been established by ANZCA and the Australian and the New Zealand Societies of Anaesthetists with the aim of revitalising the engagement of anaesthetists in incident reporting. A web-based incident reporting system is planned, owned by the speciality and with an interface that will facilitate the collection of data relevant to the contemporary practice of anaesthesia. Provision for local reporting, learning and action seems to be a valuable part of the NRLS [14]. However it does seem that some degree of repeated work characterises the process at present. Apparently most reports are entered on to a local database by administrative staff or local clinical risk managers, transcribing a paper-based primary critical-incident report. It would be better if anaesthetists themselves could (and would) simply go on line and file one definitive report electronically, but local discussion, analysis and response to the incidents is important and should be retained. Timely feedback of information to those who have taken the trouble to enter reports is a pre-requisite for success, and that alone is justification enough for the present publication. An analysis of over 12 000 incidents related to a single speciality is no mean achievement and the report of Catchpole et al. provides considerable impetus for all concerned to maintain this momentum while refining the NRLS to cater more specifically for anaesthetists, and in due course other speciality groups as well. In the meantime, what can we take from these data? One message is crystal clear. In the 2 years of the study these reports document avoidable and serious harm (including death) to at least 269 patients undergoing anaesthesia in the NHS (the actual number is almost certainly higher than this). This is unacceptable. No national airline operates on the assumption that even a small proportion of its passengers will be accidentally killed or seriously harmed every year. It has been said many times that one of the reasons investment in safety is greater in aviation than in healthcare is that medical accidents occur one at a time and so create less public impact than aeroplane crashes in which several hundred lives are lost simultaneously. In effect this report presents the collective impact of the deficiencies in current anaesthesia practice – and in this it is not inconsistent with the best available estimates of anaesthesia mortality today [15]. Yes, the safety of anaesthesia has improved, substantially, but there is no room for complacency [1]. On the contrary, these data should be seen as a call for redoubled efforts to achieve the vision of the Anesthesia Patient Safety Foundation ‘That no patient shall be harmed by anesthesia’ (http://www.apsf.org/). Data collection alone cannot effect change. As Catchpole et al. put it, there is ‘a need for both reflection and action’, and their data do provide some guidance on where effort should be expended. In descending order, the most frequent incidents in Table 2 occur in the following 6 (of 12) categories: treatment, procedure; medical device/equipment; consent, communication, confidentiality; infrastructure (including staff, facilities and environment); medication; and documentation. There is no shortage of opportunity here for improving the quality of anaesthesia. Notwithstanding any limitations of the data, this list provides support for many current initiatives to this end and the authors cite a number of references to work in progress. They mention that the NPSA was charged, not only with the establishment of a reporting and learning system, but also with the formulation of solutions for existing problems. The latter is in fact happening, with an encouraging emphasis on collaboration with the profession. For example, the NPSA is presently working with the Royal College of Anaesthetists on two projects to address the prevalent and persistent problem of drug administration error in anaesthesia [16]. Once again the report unfortunately provides very little specific information on this issue, although the category ‘medication’ ranks number 5 in frequency. Here is an excellent example of the importance of having anaesthetists themselves doing the reporting. Often, only the anaesthetist knows that a wrong drug has been given. Even for harmful drug errors, affected puzzlement as to causes on the part of the only person who knows what drugs have actually been given might be understandable (if perhaps somewhat unedifying). A de-identified, anonymous reporting system with appropriate fields for this category of speciality-relevant error would provide the ideal opportunity to capture this important information without imperilling the legal rights of practitioners related to self-incrimination. The events are often too complex to be adequately captured in simple check boxes. What is really needed is a description obtained via a person who has enough domain experience to ask the right questions about how and why each event happened. The compromise, as suggested by Catchpole et al., lies in free text entry from engaged anaesthetists – but there is no use collecting these descriptions if they are not analysed. Finally, data that demonstrate a problem demand a response: drug error is a good example where much could be done (most obviously by addressing the self-evident latent factor of look-alike ampoules with illegible labels). There is simply no point continuing to collect incident reports on a problem first identified by Cooper in 1978 and repeatedly demonstrated in innumerable studies since then [17], unless there is a will to invest in solutions. With any new initiative the challenge is to get started. Catchpole et al. have demonstrated that the basic infrastructure is in place. The database has been established and reports are pouring in. Their paper is timely and reinforces the need for ongoing surveillance of incidents in anaesthesia. New, previously unsuspected, risks will arise, and must be fleshed out. Notwithstanding the lack of any quantitative estimate of the incidence, incident reporting may also give some indication that old risks are diminishing in response to improvements in practice [18]. The need for further development of the NRLS is recognised and well articulated by the authors, who understand the need to work with each speciality in turn, and to combine the benefits of a large generic system with a group-by-group focus on domain-specific issues important to patient safety. An iterative process of reports (this being the first related to anaesthesia), analyses and improvement is consistent with the fundamental principles of continuous quality improvement [14]. The NPSA now needs to translate these sentiments into action, but equally there is an onus on anaesthetists to engage, for the simple reason that little will be achieved unless they do. Their engagement will be much more likely if the system is modified so that it becomes easier for anaesthetist to file relevant information themselves. It seems as if the NPSA is committed to bringing water to the horses, but a willingness to drink will also be essential. Only then will the analysis of the second 12 000 anaesthesia-related incidents achieve the potential of incident reporting to generate concrete, specific and practical recommendations for improving patient safety. The author has financial interests in Safer Sleep LLC which sells a product to reduce drug error in anaesthesia. He also chairs the Tripartite Committee mentioned in the editorial. The author acknowledges constructive comments from Jeff Cooper, Bill Runciman and Pat McKay and Martin Culwick. Please note: The publisher is not responsible for the content or functionality of any supporting information supplied by the authors. Any queries (other than missing content) should be directed to the corresponding author for the article.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Alan Merry (2008) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 10 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: