Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
In his K nowledge and P ractical I nterests J ason S tanley argues that the view he defends, which he calls interest‐relative invariantism, is better supported by certain cases than epistemic contextualism. In this article I argue that a version of epistemic contextualism that emphasizes the role played by the ascriber's practical interests in determining the truth‐conditions of her ‘knowledge’ ascriptions – a view that I call interests contextualism – is better supported by S tanley's cases than interest‐relative invariantism or other versions of epistemic contextualism. My main aim is to show that interests contextualism is a viable, if often over‐looked, alternative to the usual positions in the contemporary debate.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Robin McKenna (2012) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 10 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: