Stackelberg-Game-Based Dynamic Spectrum Access in Heterogeneous Wireless Systems

In this paper, we investigate a two-stage Stackelberg game for dynamic spectrum access (DSA) in cognitive radio networks using a leader [spectrum provider (SP)] subgame and a follower [secondary user (SU)] subgame. Our research distinguishes itself in a number of ways. First, a two-stage Stackelberg game has been proposed to provide a unique optimal solution that facilitates a tradeoff between quality of service (QoS) of unlicensed SUs and revenue of SPs. Second, comprehensive budget and QoS constraints imposed by the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio are defined to fully take into account QoS requirements. Third, a necessary condition and closed form for the existence of the Stackelberg equilibrium are presented for multiradio multichannel DSA. Analytical and simulation studies are carried out to assess the performance of the proposed game, and the numerical results verify that the proposed approach reaches the unique Stackelberg equilibrium.