Reframing the Treasury Debate: Industrial Strategy and State Capacity in the UK

The Treasury has long been seen as a root cause of Britain's economic malaise, blocking much‐needed industrial intervention and embedding short‐termism. This article examines the politics of Concorde and civil nuclear power in postwar Britain to show that the Treasury was not the problem in these cases. The arguments of the Treasury's critics are inverted: there was too much industrial ambition in postwar Britain—not a lack of it—and there was too much long‐termism. The policy lessons are that we need to move beyond innovation‐centric views of industrial strategy in favour of the foundational economy and imitation‐led growth, with devolution—not breaking up the Treasury—as a surer route to pro‐productivity, pro‐growth policies. This should be complemented by a stronger Cabinet Office capability to assess major cross‐departmental problems, such as industrial strategy.