Qualitative policy analysis reveals critical shortcomings in Western military reform efforts in post-Bashir Sudan, highlighting how technocratic interventions exacerbate local political fractures.
This article examines the shortcomings of American and British efforts to promote military reform in post-Bashir Sudan and situates these shortcomings within broader debates on civil–military relations and external Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Africa. While the literature emphasizes local ownership, gradual sequencing, and consensus-building, American and British engagement in Sudan was characterized by selective consensus-building that deepened fragmentation; technocratic urgency that neglected sequencing and incentives; and reluctance to confront regional partners whose policies directly affected Sudan’s military balance. The analysis draws on secondary literature, official statements, and twenty-one semi-structured interviews conducted with Sudanese political actors, former transitional officials, and American diplomats, and policy experts.
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Rawia Tawfik (2026) studied this question.
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