Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
The article ‘An Economic Test for an Unlawful Agreement to Adopt a Third-Party’s Pricing Algorithm’ by Joe Harrington addresses a pertinent issue in today’s rapidly evolving market surrounding third-party pricing tools. These tools developed from mere price monitoring to providing Artificial Intelligence-supported price recommendations, presenting both opportunities and challenges for regulators, researchers and market participants. Of particular concern is the potential adoption of identical pricing algorithms among competitors, which has drawn regulatory attention due to potential anticompetitive implications. While such algorithms promise operational efficiencies and improved responsiveness to market dynamics, they also introduce risks of collusion. The distinction between lawful and unlawful adoption of a common third-party pricing service hinges on whether firms adopt the service jointly or individually. The paper proposes a test to distinguish between benign and unlawful adoption of a common pricing algorithm by exploiting the theoretical properties of equilibrium prices under collusive versus efficiency-driven adoption. The primary idea is based on the theoretical result that average prices will increase with the adoption rate only under joint adoption. Harrington’s model also confirms that joint adoption, on average, leads to higher prices than individual adoption; hence, there is indeed an associated welfare loss, and competition authorities are warranted in paying attention to such arrangements.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Geza Sapi (2025) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 10 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: