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Previous analyses of the relationship between executive compensation incentives and R&D (Research and Development) investment have resulted in contradictory findings. This study attempts to resolve these contradictions by exploring the nonlinear relationship between executive compensation incentives and R&D investment, then examining the moderating effect of executive overconfidence. Using the 173 Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) companies, that disclosed data from 2012–2015 as a sample, a multiple regression analysis model is constructed. The results show that there is an inverted u-shaped relationship between executive compensation incentives and R&D investment. Moreover, the executive overconfidence of senior executives has a positive moderating effect between executive compensation incentives and research and development.
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Lu et al. (2020) studied this question.
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