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IF all firms in an industry act in concert to determine pricing policies, they can maximize their combined profits. Traditional oligopoly theory argues that oligopolists generally appreciate this fact and therefore they desire to collude to maximize their joint long-run profits. Theory also suggests that the character and scope of collusive conduct is related to the structural and legal conditions confronting the firms in a market. 1 Thus, with respect to structural conditions, theory predicts that collusive conduct is more likely to occur when, among other things, the number of firms in an industry is small, the cost and demand curves facing individual enterprises are fairly uniform, the opportunities for secret chiseling are limited, and the flow of product purchases is evenly distributed through time rather than being uneven and lumpy. To a large degree, none of these factors taken singly appears to be a sufficient condition nor, with the possible exception of the numbers of participants, even a necessary condition for effective collusion; instead, the emergence of an effective coalition seems to depend on some broad combination of these conditions. If, for instance, there are only two or three firms in the market, the existence of severely heterogeneous costs and demands among these firms and large opportunities for chiseling might nevertheless foster much competitive independence. For this reason, a determination of the importance of these structural conditions represents a necessary element in explaining the relationship between industry structure and conduct. The purpose of this paper is to assess empirically the impact of structural conditions on collusive price conduct. Through an analysis of publicly available information generated in formal legal actions of the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department ofJustice against illegal (explicit) price fixing arrangements it is possible to portray the conditions favorable to explicit price collusion and also tacit collusion and competitive independence. We begin in section II with a limited review of prior empirical work in this area. Section III describes the data which will be used in our analysis and explains how these data may be applied to test certain structure-conduct hypotheses. Our
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Frass et al. (1977) studied this question.
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