Lobbying and Corruption in the Colombian Congress: A Preliminary Exploration

This article examines how lobbying and corruption operate within the Colombian Congress. It analyzes how powerful actors—particularly in the executive branch and business sector—have sought to shape congressional decisions to their advantage, and the implications for democratic governance. The study draws on a review of scholarly literature, official documents, legislation, and press coverage, as well as twenty-seven semi-structured interviews with individuals directly involved in lobbying activities, including congresspersons, former congresspersons and lobbyists representing business and private associations. The article analyzes both the differences and similarities between lobbying and corruption, revealing how these practices operate within Congress. It also examines the institutional conditions that have fostered corruption within this governmental body and assesses the risk of state capture. The findings suggest that the Colombian Congress is highly vulnerable to capture by powerful interest groups, although there is not yet sufficient evidence to conclude that it consistently serves specific economic and political actors. While institutional reforms are needed to reduce this vulnerability, designing and implementing them presents significant political challenges. This study contributes to the literature by addressing a gap in research on lobbying and corruption in Colombia. Although prior work has examined the business sector, few studies have focused on how its organizations engage in lobbying and corruption practices, or on the consequences for democracy. Likewise, the relationship between the executive and legislative branches has rarely been analyzed through the lens of lobbying. More broadly, while the state capture has been studied in some developing contexts, the Colombian case remains underexplored and constrained by limited empirical evidence.