Managing the Political Life Cycle of Regulation in the UK and German Telecommunication Sectors

Abstract**** Résumé en fin d’article; Zusammenfassung am Ende des Artikels; resumen al fin del artículo. : Economic regulators are accountable to politicians – both government and ministers – parallel regulatory authorities, such as cartel offices, consumers and regulatees. This article investigates how the relationship between regulators and stakeholders evolves as a function of market developments and political learning. Drawing on a comparative case study of the UK and German telecommunication sector, the paper illustrates how regulators constrained by administrative and business traditions have asserted their discretion over politicians by developing sophisticated political relationship with a wide range of stakeholders. The paper concludes that while regulators have undoubtedly diverged from the initial delegation of powers, there is little evidence to suggest that European regulators will converge on a single regulatory model.