Confutation of Political Realism

For nearly half a century, political realism has been widely regarded as the dominant paradigm in the field of international politics. Yet, despite realism's preeminence, the theory remains one of the most misunderstood and misapplied theories of international politics. The misinterpretations and misuses of realism, in turn, have contributed to the persistence of confusion regarding the theory's main tenets and its analytic utility. Over the years, several studies have attempted to identify realism's philosophical and epistemological presuppositions. To date, however, no systematic analysis of the epistemological liabilities of political realism has appeared. This article is an attempt to offer such an analysis by relating the formal structure of the theory to the epistemological requirements for its empirical confirmation and confutation. Several approaches and rescue attempts to save realism from potential falsifying evidence are examined in detail. The article's main conclusion is that political realism, properly understood, is empirically an untenable theory.