Public governance and corporate innovation: evidence from a quasi-natural event in China

Using a unique quasi-natural event, i.e. gangdom and evil forces (hereafter, GEs) elimination in China, we investigate the relationship between the public governance proxied by GEs elimination and corporate innovation based on the data of Chinese listed firms from 2013 to 2021. The results show that the GEs elimination leads to a 0.39% increase in corporate innovation investment. Quantitatively, the increase is approximately equivalent to 4.42 million yuan for a firm of median innovation investment. Furthermore, we find that the GEs elimination increases corporate innovation through two possible channels: relieving financing constraints and intensifying market competition. In addition, we also reveal that the effects of GEs elimination on corporate innovation are stronger in firms located in a better marketization environment and a stronger Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) protection environment. Our main results pass a series of robustness tests and endogeneity issues.