In the 1980s occurrences of gunboat diplomacy—the demonstration, threat, or use of limited naval force for political objectives—have been particularly prominent and controversial. This study examines when this strategy is most (and least) effective in attaining its objectives. After placing gunboat diplomacy in its general theoretical context, 10 hypotheses emerge regarding the influence of (1) the nature of the incident, (2) the assailant—victim relationship, and (3) the nature of the assailant and victim. Using a database of 133 incidents of gunboat diplomacy ranging from 1946 to 1978, this article empirically tests the hypotheses and statistically evaluates them. The results indicate that the most effective gunboat diplomacy involves a definitive, deterrent display of force undertaken by an assailant who has engaged in war in the victim's region and who is militarily prepared and politically stable compared to the victim.
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Robert Mandel (1986) studied this question.
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