The Party-State Liaison in Korea: Searching for Evidence of the Cartelized System

Why has the Korean political party system remained undemocratic despite the introduction of democratic reforms in 1987? To answer this question, the party-state relationship in Korea demands investigation, since it forms the environment of party competition. This article reveals evidence that indicates the existence of “cartel parties” in Korean politics that stifle competition. The study examines three dimensions of party environment: electoral competition, financial linkage, and patronage in the allocation of government positions. First, Korean political parties compete in an environment where electoral competition is extremely capital-intensive and contained, and media access is unevenly distributed and monopolized by the major parties. Second, under the current system, only strong parties can really take advantage of state subvention. Third, patronage in the process of allocating government positions suggests that the party system is slowly petrifying. These findings suggest that the Korean party system is a closed system owing to the formation of cartels between the two strongest parties and the state.