What does this research mean for the field?

Although plurality voting generally produces higher post-election income inequality than proportional representation for a given number of parties, proportional representation with more than five parties results in higher inequality than a two-party plurality system. Novelty: ClaimNovelty.CONTRADICTORY. Consensus alignment: ConsensusAlignment.CHALLENGES_CONSENSUS.

What question did this study set out to answer?

To evaluate and compare post-election income distributions and Gini coefficients generated by plurality voting and proportional representation electoral systems.

August 22, 2026Journal of Theoretical Politics

Distributive consequences of plurality voting versus proportional representation

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Authors

TGThorsten Giertz

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Overview

Theoretical modeling study reveals higher post-election income inequality under plurality voting, suggesting proportional representation is not unconditionally more egalitarian.

Key Points

To evaluate and compare post-election income distributions and Gini coefficients generated by plurality voting and proportional representation electoral systems.
Applied Myerson's (1993) game-theoretic model of electoral competition to single-winner plurality voting and proportional representation systems.
Derived post-election income distributions and computed Gini coefficients across varying numbers of competing political parties.
Identical equilibrium campaign strategies generated substantially different post-election income distributions between plurality voting and proportional representation.
Plurality voting produced higher post-election income inequality than proportional representation for any fixed number of competing parties, with inequality rising faster under plurality voting as party numbers increased.
When plurality voting was restricted to two parties under Duverger's law, proportional representation exhibited higher inequality once the number of simulated parties exceeded five.

Cite This Study

Thorsten Giertz (2026) studied this question.

synapsesocial.com/papers/6a895f62ca7ade938187dfc8 https://doi.org/10.1177/09516298261477703

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August 22, 2026Journal of Theoretical Politics

Distributive consequences of plurality voting versus proportional representation

View Full Paper

Ask AI

Bookmark

Authors

TGThorsten Giertz

Discussion

Member takes

Overview

Theoretical modeling study reveals higher post-election income inequality under plurality voting, suggesting proportional representation is not unconditionally more egalitarian.

Key Points

To evaluate and compare post-election income distributions and Gini coefficients generated by plurality voting and proportional representation electoral systems.
Applied Myerson's (1993) game-theoretic model of electoral competition to single-winner plurality voting and proportional representation systems.
Derived post-election income distributions and computed Gini coefficients across varying numbers of competing political parties.
Identical equilibrium campaign strategies generated substantially different post-election income distributions between plurality voting and proportional representation.
Plurality voting produced higher post-election income inequality than proportional representation for any fixed number of competing parties, with inequality rising faster under plurality voting as party numbers increased.
When plurality voting was restricted to two parties under Duverger's law, proportional representation exhibited higher inequality once the number of simulated parties exceeded five.

Cite This Study

Thorsten Giertz (2026) studied this question.

synapsesocial.com/papers/6a895f62ca7ade938187dfc8 https://doi.org/10.1177/09516298261477703

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