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The effects of a new firm's entry into the telecom service market are examined further. These consist of up- and downstream markets, corresponding to the first and second stages in game theory. When a new entrant can succeed in process innovation and lower production cost, entry of the entrant transforms the market structure into a Joint-Profit-Maximization monopoly under the European Commission (EC) constraint. However, the post-entry market becomes more competitive if the EC Commition did not intervene the market. We observed that violation of the test does not necessarily mean the incumbent practices a margin squeeze. The EC Commision does not prove that margin squeeze is not a necessary and sufficient condition for the exit. Furthermore, Joint-Profit-Maximization monopoly can serve to explain why Japanese Telecoms fees are high.
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Yang et al. (2023) studied this question.
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