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Contemporary philosophical orthodoxy treats names as universally accessible, arbitrary tags that track referents across space, time and possibility. I argue that paradigmatic nicknames, like ‘Shrimpy’, ‘Crooked Hillary’ and ‘Bubblegum’, do track referents, but are marked by contrast with proper names by enforcing restrictions on who they can be used by and with, and when they can be used; and by framing their referents under affectively valenced social identities. While proper names can also carry social information, it is part of nicknames’ characteristic function to manage face, in ways that an adequate overall theory of meaning needs to explain.
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Elisabeth Camp (2025) studied this question.
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