Conceptual analysis reveals that meaningful living requires both wholehearted subjective caring and evaluative worthiness, suggesting an integrated framework across philosophy and theology.
I examine Harry Frankfurt’s work on caring, love, and the structure of the will as a resource for understanding meaning in life. I distinguish meaning in life from happiness and moral goodness and situate Frankfurt within subjectivist, objectivist, and hybrid theories. I then reconstruct an implicit Frankfurtian account in which a life is meaningful when it is shaped by self-defining cares and loves that generate volitional necessity and narrative coherence. I argue that Frankfurt identifies the subjective conditions of meaningful living rather than offering a complete theory of meaning. This is a substantive feature of his position: reasons are grounded in what persons care about and love, not in objective standards. Building on this insight, I develop a constructive Frankfurt-inspired hybrid account that combines the subjective structure of caring with evaluative reflection on the worthiness of what is loved. This proposal is a philosophical and theological extension of Frankfurt’s account, not an interpretation of his own position. It preserves his analysis of caring, love, and volitional necessity while treating meaningful lives as requiring both wholehearted commitment and concern for evaluative worth. I conclude by considering implications for philosophy, theology, and empirical research.
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Richard Bailey (2026) studied this question.
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