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This paper examines Chinese responses to North Korea’s confrontational acts in 2009-2014, such as the two nuclear tests, the three satellite launches, the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong incidents, and the various missile tests. It suggests that Chinese attitudes toward North Korean belligerence have considerably fluctuated, and the changes that occurred were not always of an incremental nature. In some cases, China adopted a less critical attitude, while on other occasions it judged Pyongyang’s conduct more harshly. The paper argues that China’s responses were shaped partly by the specific nature of the crises at hand, and partly by Beijing’s changing relations with the other major powers (the U.S., Russia, and Japan). It concludes that North Korea was partly able to take advantage of these patterns of Chinese behavior but its tactics often proved counterproductive.
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Balázs Szalontai (2015) studied this question.
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