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Nowadays much legislation is effectively brought about by experts. Import from experts in legislation may be a welcome contribution to legislative quality. In “Legislation and Expertise on Goals” I address a fundamental objection against expert legislation, namely that the required expertise cannot exist. Briefly stated, the objection boils down to the following: The quality of legislation depends in part on the goals pursued by means of the legislation. There can be no expertise on goals because they are not an object of knowledge, but rather of adoption. Knowledge which standards are good, or suitable, is fundamentally impossible, and expertise on this subject is for the same reason out of the question. I will call this the argument from the “cognitive gap”.The main conclusion of “Legislation and Expertise on Goals” is that the argument from the cognitive gap is flawed, basically because it confuses truth and justification. Starting from a coherentist account of justification, I argue why expertise on standards is in principle possible. That cuts the bottom out of the cognitive gap argument against expert legislation. A second conclusion is that expertise is both possible in some “purely factual” areas and some standard-based areas, while it is also impossible in some other “purely factual” areas and standard-based areas. Anyway, there seems to be no ground to exclude in general the possibility of expert legislation because expertise on legislation would be impossible.
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Jaap Hage (2009) studied this question.
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