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In this issue of the Journal diverse opinions about medical futility are presented. It is not surprising that medical futility has become a prominent topic in the medical ethics literature. There are many social and professional forces that have kindled this interest, including, but not limited to, skyrocketing health care costs and the professionals’ tacit sense of responsibility to contain health care costs. In addition, publicized legal cases of family members demanding life-sustaining treatment for patients with permanent mental incapacitation (circumstances that seem “worse than death” to many) have generated professional outrage that patients’ families can demand and obtain treatments that seem intuitively wrong and outside professional standards. Three other forces are fueling this interest: the growing awareness that increased access to health care means access to “basic” health care and constraints on “non-basic” health care; the brewing conflict between patients and their physicians over conflicting physician roles and advocacy responsibilities that marketplace competition is fostering; and the gentle swinging of the pendulum away from patient autonomy and individualism toward social and community responsibility. In considering the question posed in the title, it is necessary to review 3 critical issues regarding the current uses of medical futility. Then, it is important to identify the goals, concerns, and opportunities in developing medical futility policies. One critical issue is the definition of medical futility. Even in this issue of the Journal, it varies significantly between articles. Without defining and establishing criteria for the determination of medical futility, physicians, patients, and ethicists will use the same word without shared understanding. Thus, a definition and criteria need to be developed, debated, and agreed upon. Three terms are frequently used for medical futility: physiological futility, quantitative futility, and qualitative futility. The major value of considering the term physiological futility is that it distinguishes between treatment having merely a physiological effect and that having a medical benefit to the patient. Other than this value, which has importance in medical education, this term rarely captures the central issues in the current controversy. Although certainty (medical and other) is a convenient but false presumption, it seems reasonable to distinguish between treatments that do not have any theoretical or empirical support and those that have a low likelihood of success. The former types of treatment might be referred to as useless. Physicians do not have any obligation to offer or provide such treatments, and doing so would undermine the integrity of the profession. Treatments with a rare or low likelihood of success may be characterized as quantitatively futile. Schneiderman et al propose considering a probability of less than 1 percent.1 Although one can argue about the confidence intervals around point estimates of probabilities or the lack of data that fit a unique patient experience, the idea of a probabilistic component to futility has merit. Unfortunately, neither professional nor community consensus has emerged about where the profession or society should draw a line indicating the limits of offering and/or providing reasonable options. Another component of medical futility is qualitative futility. This raises the issue that some treatments may be successful, but the resultant existence falls below some lower limit of quality of life. Here again, Schneiderman et al have suggested a starting point for discussion: persistent vegetative state and permanent dependency in an ICU.1 Although others have argued that living in an ICU might provide acceptable quality of life to some patients, the idea of terribly impaired quality of life has some relevance to the determination of whether a treatment provides sufficient benefit to outweigh its burdens (ie, is it worth it). However, this invocation to consider the medical determination of qualitative futility raises a legitimate concern about 1 person judging another person's quality of life as a value of life.2,3 Current use of medical futility in clinical practice provides insights that deserve further attention. Just as the authors in this Journal have different understandings, so do clinicians. In academic settings that teach contemporary issues in clinical ethics, there seems to be growing awareness of the complexities of medical futility. However, in nonacademic clinical settings, physicians hold the traditional philosophy that physicians are not obligated to offer or provide futile treatment. This means that they determine what treatment in a particular clinical situation qualifies as medical futility and then communicate what they deem appropriate. Thus, medical futility often is seen in the community as a clinical issue within the scope of physician authority. In a few cities, medical institutions have developed futility policies. In these policies, medical futility usually is defined vaguely and determined by the physician. Physicians sometimes are obligated to communicate their determination to patients, and if patients still want the treatment they can receive it if a physician is willing to provide the treatment and the patients are willing to pay for it. The latter issue highlights the direct linkage to cost containment. A third critical issue pertains to the relevance of the value judgments inherent in the determination of quantitative and qualitative futility. In quantitative futility, the value judgment rests in the meaning and value of the probability. In qualitative futility, the value judgment rests in the meaning and value of the existence. The empirical ethics literature has demonstrated discrepancies in value judgments between physicians and patients. Physicians often value patient quality of life as being worse than do patients;4 many patients consider living with severe dementia or in a permanent coma as better than being dead,5 and physicians often do not share an understanding of patients’ preferences for life-sustaining treatment.6 In addition, recent data indicate that there is wide variability among physicians in their understanding of (and values about) quantitative futility.7 It is true that physician behaviors and recommendations always reflect value judgments; it is intrinsic to the art of medicine. However, it is also true that societal values (often represented by legal opinions) influence professional behaviors. An obvious example is informed consent. The determination of what procedures and activities require informed consent has been a synthesis of professional and societal influences. The reasonable person standard was not an idea that the medical profession generated. Thus, the shaping of professional practices by societal values obviously applies to the contentious issue of judging patient quality of life (qualitative futility), and even applies to quantitative futility. The obvious question that arises is why has medical futility become a battleground between physicians and patients (or their family members), rather than an area for thoughtful deliberation and negotiation. In part, I believe that it is because of physician inclination to exert authority and avoid sharing uncertainty with patients.8 And in part, it is because patients represent a culture with expectations and an orientation that embraces “rescue” medicine on a case by case basis. Where do we go from here? First, it is very important for the medical profession to identify what it thinks is medically futile and to offer the rationale for these judgments. Professional attempts to characterize the scope of their responsibilities in providing marginally beneficial treatment should be encouraged as it serves to standardize practice and limit inter-physician variability. The variability in defining and describing medical futility that likely will occur between physicians, specialties, geographic locales, target populations, and practice organizations deserves critical analysis by professionals and the public. Second, institutional policies that attempt to include futility should avoid covert use of medical futility. The value-laden nature of these judgments demands communication between physicians and patients if the trusted fiduciary relationship is to continue. Institutions that choose to include medical futility in policies need to recognize that problems with futility may occur at both extremes. Patients or family members may request treatment that seems highly unlikely to be successful (>0%) or of marginal value, and physicians may not want to offer or provide treatment that either has a relatively low rate of success or results in a questionable quality of life. This recognition may lead to different policies depending on their mission. For example, in a teaching hospital, promotion of doctor-patient communication and the desire to minimize physician errors might lead to obligatory communication about judgments of medical futility, not allowing physicians to unilaterally withhold or withdraw treatment (unless the treatment is useless as previously described), and use of conflict resolution strategies, including principled negotiation, to resolve disagreements between physicians and patients (or family members). Institutions also need to recognize that a component of the unease over futility involves issues of costs in relationship to possible and/or marginal benefits. This linkage to societal policies (cost-containment and rationing) argues for policies that are developed with representation from all interested and affected parties and that are explicit, public, and accessible to patients. Fourth, physicians should be able to transfer care to another provider if they consider providing a particular treatment in a specific situation to be personally reprehensible. Fifth, even after the development of explicit policies, there should be opportunities for offering and providing futile treatments out of compassion or if the patient is willing to pay for the full costs of the treatment. Sixth, discussing perceptions of medical futility with patients offers a wonderful opportunity to uncover useful, problem-solving information, such as inaccurate assumptions, degree of hope, areas of confusion, and relevant patient values. Understanding the reasons for patient (or family) requests for medically futile treatments provides an opportunity for greater shared understanding of patient values and the increased likelihood of maximizing beneficial treatments. Moreover, understanding the true reasons for physician opposition to offering or providing medical treatment should enable physicians to understand better the threats to the primacy of the physician-patient relationship.
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Robert A. Pearlman (1994) studied this question.
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