Pension problem is choice: the fiscal arithmetic of preserving universal superannuation

New Zealand’s pension debate rests on promises that cannot all be kept. Major political parties offer incomplete solutions: preserving NZS from 65 through taxation; raising eligibility to 67; spending restraint; lower taxation; or compulsory saving. This paper uses an age-structured fiscal model to stress-test policy alternatives. Higher fertility and migration ease pressure but do not eliminate it. NZS is projected to absorb nearly one-third of core tax revenue by 2065. Raising eligibility to 67 reduces this pressure but is insufficient alone. We propose a mixed strategy: increase eligibility by one month annually from 2029, moderate indexation, compulsory KiwiSaver with support for lower-income workers, continue Crown contributions to the NZ Superannuation Fund, retain universal NZS, and protect those unable to work longer. The choice is not whether adjustment occurs, but whether it is managed gradually now through this policy mix or imposed later through disruptive tax rises and spending cuts.