This article examines how the interaction between customary law and state institutions shapes governance outcomes in Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka, where plural legal systems persist as central features of post-colonial state formation. Existing scholarship recognizes legal pluralism but insufficiently explains its implications for institutional coherence and state authority. The study aims to address this gap by analyzing how institutional arrangements produce and sustain fragmented governance. Employing a qualitative comparative design grounded in socio-legal analysis, the article draws on legal texts, policy documents, and doctrinal interpretation. The findings demonstrate that institutionalized ambiguity and asymmetrical power relations generate fragmented legitimacy, producing regulatory uncertainty, inconsistent adjudication, and uneven enforcement. Rather than facilitating coordination, plural legal orders are strategically structured to preserve state dominance while delegating localized authority. The article advances a reconceptualization of legal pluralism as a governance mechanism and highlights the need for institutional designs that address fragmentation without erasing normative diversity.
Marah et al. (2026) studied this question.