When oil fuels conflict: Economic hardship and diversionary incentives in petrostates

Do petrostates become more likely to initiate diversionary conflict? If so, why? The existing studies primarily focus on the characteristics of leaders, issues, and countries but pay less attention to the role of natural resources, in particular oil. This study examines whether petrostates are more likely to initiate diversionary conflict than non-petrostates. I argue that oil's economic, geological, and historical characteristics can increase leaders’ diversionary incentives by expanding their capabilities, opportunities, and expected political returns from conflict, making militarized conflict more attractive as a means of demonstrating competence or rallying domestic support. Using directed dyad-year data from 1953 to 2009, the analysis finds that petrostates are more likely to initiate militarized conflicts than non-petrostates during periods of economic hardship. These findings highlight the importance of understanding how economic conditions in petrostates may contribute to regional instability and international security.