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This article explores China’s outsourcing of security functions to the private sector within the broader context of the security privatization scholarship, offering a nuanced understanding of the relationship between Beijing’s security privatization and the political-instrumentalist theory. Specifically, it tests how the theory fares against the Chinese system – a governance system other than democracies. How does China’s use of Chinese Military and Security Companies (CMSCs) affect the political-instrumentalist theorization of the PMSCs scholarship? How does China’s trajectory – overtly pursuing security pluralization but covertly defying security privatization as explained by Western cases – influence the study and theorization of the security privatization scholarship? I utilize qualitative research design, organizing data from publicly available Chinese official security and defence documents to answer the questions. It draws on content and discourse analyses to argue that the safety of Chinese national interests abroad and the government’s desire to respond to Chinese people’s demand for protection and avoid political costs incentivizes Chinese governmental actors to outsource overseas security functions and services to CMSCs. This situation becomes a strategy of accepting greater rather than shirking responsibility or evading accountability, contradicting the political-instrumentalist explanation of security privatization.
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Thomas Ameyaw‐Brobbey (2025) studied this question.
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