Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
This paper investigates whether and how office-holding politicians strategically time salient legislative decisions to periods of higher or lower media attention, and how such strategies depend on electoral incentives. I analyze confidence votes in Italy (2011–2022), exploiting the institutional rule that allows governments to link the approval of a bill to a confidence vote. Comparing partisan and “technical” governments, I find that partisan cabinets are 3–4 pp. less likely to schedule votes before predictable news events, whereas this effect is absent for technical governments led by non-partisan prime ministers. The pattern is robust across alternative event sets and time windows, and is absent around unpredictable news shocks (natural disasters) and ordinary parliamentary sittings. Moreover, the effect is stronger for narrow-majority governments, and economic legislation. Taken together, the evidence indicates that partisan cabinets strategically time confidence votes to avoid competing with major news, consistent with an accountability- and coalition-signaling motive.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Giuseppe Spataro (2026) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 10 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: