Global Competition Law Beyond Treaties: The Rise and Limits of Networks

In the absence of a binding international treaty, global competition law has increasingly been governed through decentralised and network-based forms of cooperation among national authorities. This paper examines how such governance operates, evaluates its effectiveness, and assesses whether it constitutes a viable long-term regulatory model rather than merely a temporary failure of legal harmonisation. It adopts a qualitative doctrinal approach, relying on critical analysis of existing scholarship and drawing on comparative and interdisciplinary literature to explore institutional practices, enforcement dynamics, and legitimacy concerns. The findings show that network-based governance has facilitated cooperation, mutual learning, and a degree of normative convergence, particularly through soft law instruments and institutional networks. However, its effectiveness remains limited by structural constraints, including disparities in enforcement capacity, lack of binding authority, and persistent asymmetries between jurisdictions. These limitations are further exacerbated by the increasing complexity of digital markets and the challenges of regulating cross-border conduct in rapidly evolving economic environments. The paper concludes that, while imperfect, governance without a treaty represents a pragmatic and evolving model, and that targeted reforms to existing networks are more feasible than pursuing a comprehensive multilateral convention.