The presence of artificial intelligence in the field of justice is perceived today as a widespread phenomenon with a metamorphic effect on the exercise of judicial power, raising sensitive questions regarding the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms both in general and in relation to justice. The novelty no longer lies in whether it can be used, but how, to what extent and with what legal guarantees, especially since the normative content of the decision itself is influenced. Under this scientific impulse, this paper is a legal-normative and critical observation of the use of artificial intelligence in justice, taking into account the ambivalent nature of this technology. Artificial intelligence supports the identification of inequalities and leads to better-founded public policies, but, on the other hand, problems arise regarding algorithmic opacity, data bias, excessive surveillance and the diminution of human control, all of which affect the substance of fundamental guarantees. The study examines European legislation, with a focus on European Union (EU) Regulation 2024/1689 on artificial intelligence, and emphasises the maintenance of person-centred, flexible and adaptive regulation. Finally, solutions are sought that reconcile technological efficiency and the effective protection of fundamental rights.
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Lozneanu et al. (2026) studied this question.
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