Modelling Personnel Behaviour in Implementing Process Innovations Based on Game Theory

The aim of the study is to provide a theoretical and methodological justification for using game theory to analyse and minimize personnel resistance to innovation, as well as to demonstrate how managerial decisions can transform employees’ strategic behaviour. The objective is to formalize the interaction process between groups of employees under conditions of innovation implementation using mathematical models of game theory and to identify the conditions under which cooperative behaviour becomes the dominant strategy. The research methods are based on the fundamental principles of game theory and methods of economic and mathematical modelling. The study uses matrix game analysis to compare the outcomes of strategic interaction in two scenarios: without management involvement and with an active managerial policy. The novelty of the study lies in developing an original model of interaction between software developers and testers, which clearly illustrates the transition from equilibrium at the point of mutual imitation (opportunism) to equilibrium at the point of mutual cooperation under the influence of specific managerial measures (training, KPIs, and coordination). The results show that, in the absence of managerial intervention, rational player choice leads to innovation failure. Introducing an incentive system and reducing labour costs through training changes the payoff structure, making active employee participation in innovation the dominant strategy. The findings state that game theory is not only an analytical tool but also a practical method for developing personnel management strategies. Changing the structure of the game (the payoff matrix) allows management to deliberately form a Nash equilibrium in which it is economically beneficial for employees to participate in innovation, thereby reducing resistance and improving the effectiveness of organizational changes.