Routine innovation can help enterprises eliminate old routines that do not adapt to the environment, introduce new routines with high efficiency, and improve the adaptability of enterprises and the environment. Based on this, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model between enterprises and employees, explores the game relationship between enterprise innovation incentives and employee practice innovation, and uses simulation to analyze the influence of different parameters on the evolution path of both parties in the game. The results show that there are two kinds of evolutionary stability strategies, and the final result depends on the parameter values in the payoff matrix. The relationship between income and cost is the decisive factor affecting enterprises and employees' strategy choices. One effective measure to promote enterprise innovation is the third-party reward. Establishing reasonable revenue distribution mechanisms is conducive to improving employees' innovation initiatives. This paper contributes to the advancement of research in the field of routine innovation and broadens the use of organizational routines in corporate governance.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Huang et al. (2024) studied this question.