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In 1994 Mexico joined the world wave of new constitutionalism with the passage of a constitutional amendment that, among other things, empowered the Supreme Court as a constitutional tribunal. As a result, the SC and the judiciary in general increasingly acquired a prominent role in the enforcement of constitutional rights as well as in the adjudication of conflicts between government branches. The year of 2024 marked the end of that process: MORENA, the party in government, threw Mexico into uncharted territory by making it the only country in the world to select all judges by popular election. The dismantling of Mexico’s constitutional democracy, however, did not happen in a vacuum. Indeed, in order to understand it one can’t focus on a single actor (i.e., the party in government), but has to pay attention to a larger amendment culture that allows the arbitrary exercise of public power through the amendment mechanism. This article argues that, at least in part, the current crisis can be understood as the responsibility of, on the one hand, the political elite as a whole – i.e., political parties across the political spectrum, not just MORENA; and, on the other hand, of the Supreme Court (mainly because of its understanding of the scope and limits of the amendment power).
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Mariana Velasco-Rivera (2025) studied this question.
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