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Rights are often seen as political constitutionalism’s Achilles heel. This chapter argues the very nature of a rights claim implies a democratic process in which citizens have the status of political equals when formulating collective decisions that are to apply equally to all. It relates this democratic argument for rights to the republican conception of liberty as non-domination, rejecting along the way the liberal account of rights as trumps and its origins in a view of freedom as non-interference. Finally, it shows how this association between rights and democracy can be actualized within real democratic processes. Nonetheless, this account proves compatible with systems of ‘weak review’, such as those associated with the Human Rights Act discussed in Chapter 4.
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Richard Bellamy (2012) studied this question.
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