Judicial Appointments: Critical Analysis of Collegium System

Judiciary is one of the three pillars of democracy. In order to protect and act as a custodian of rights an independent and impartial judiciary is quintessential. Independence of judiciary is a touchstone of constitutional democracy, and the process of judicial appointments plays a crucial role in this aspect. This paper critically examines the evolution, constitutional basis, and functioning of the collegium system for the appointment and transfer of judges to the Supreme Court and High Courts in India. It analyses the judicial precedents that gave rise to the collegium system through the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Judges' Cases, while evaluating the constitutional tensions between judicial independence and executive accountability. The paper further examines the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) and the Supreme Court's decision striking it down on the ground that it violated the basic structure of the Constitution. Recent developments concerning independence of judiciary in particular to delays are further discussed. A comparison of judicial appointments in the United States, the United Kingdom, and South Africa provides a broader perspective on balancing transparency, accountability, and judicial independence.