Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
The us Air Force’s and Navy’s semi-autonomous radar- and infrared-guided air-to-air missiles performed miserably in air combat over Vietnam. Despite accusations that the military’s overreliance on complex technology was to blame, the two services continued to invest in ever-more advanced fighter aircraft and high-tech missiles after the war. In 1977 at the behest of Congress, the Air Force and Navy spent almost a full year evaluating air combat tactics and new infrared-guided air-to-air missiles. According to the services’ interpretation of the results from the aimval and aceval tests, future air combat demanded both improved infrared-guided missiles and revolutionary radar-guided missiles. The apparent paradox—testing infrared missiles to justify a more expensive radar-guided missile—was seized on by the military “Reformers” as emblematic of the us military’s unhealthy fascination with exorbitantly priced high-technology. This paper discusses the pivotal aimval-aceval tests, including their laborious design process and execution, and their subsequent role animating the early-1980s public debate over military technology. This understanding is crucial when evaluating the relative significance of organizational inertia in the Air Force’s air-to-air procurement decisions following Vietnam. Additionally, the aimval-aceval tests offer evidence of three pathologies that distinguish military tests from their typical civilian exemplars: military tests cannot be conducted independent of the service(s); the tests are generally inflexible and unreplicable; and their data are usually shrouded by classification concerns. These pathologies make it difficult to reconcile divergent interpretations and resolve controversies that emerge from military testing activities.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Steven A. Fino (2014) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 9 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: